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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Civil Rights-Racial Discrimination in Teacher Hiring and
Assignment Forbidden
In two recent cases involving teacher discrimination in the Dur-
ham and in the Hendersonville, North Carolina public school sys-
tems the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
ordered that decisions as to employment and retention of teachers
be made without regard to race.
Wheeler v. Durham City Bd. of Ediuc.1 is another step in the
continuing litigation by which Negro parents and pupils in Durham
have sought "rights and privileges assertedly accorded them by
Brown v. Board of Education .. 2
In 1965 the court of appeals disapproved a: pupil assignment plan
tendered by the school board and remanded in order that a constitu-
tional plan might be adopted.3 On remand the plaintiffs opposed a
new "Permanent Plan for Desegregation of the Durham City
Schools"4 solely because no provision was made in the school board
plan to eliminate race as a factor in teacher employment; and they
applied to the court for an order effectuating such a provision. After
a full evidentiary hearing the district court denied their application.'
Denial was grounded on lack of jurisdiction to adjudicate teachers'
rights-since none were parties to the action-and on the plain-
tiffs' failure to prove any substantial relation between teacher em-
ployment and assignment on the basis of race and the constitutional-
ity of the proposed pupil plan.'
On appeal, the court of appeals held that it was error to refuse
the order sought by plaintiffs and reversed. Judge Bryan, speaking
for a unanimous court said:
'363 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1966).
2Id. at 739. This litigation was begun in 1960 and the principal case is
the fourth appeal in the series. For a complete recount up to, but not in-
cluding, the principal case see Wheeler v. Durham City Bd. of Educ., 346
F.2d 768, 768-72 (4th Cir. 1965). It is significant that plaintiffs' conten-
tions have been unanimously sustained in all four appeals.
'Wheeler v. Durham City Bd. of Educ., 346 F.2d 768 (4th Cir. 1965).
'363 F.2d at 740.
0Wheeler v. Durham City Bd. of Educ., 249 F. Supp. 145 (M.D.N.C.
1966).
Old. at 153-54.
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We read ... [Bradley v. School Board] as authority for the
proposition that removal of race considerations from faculty se-
lection and allocation is, as a matter of law, an inseparable and
indispensable command within the abolition of pupil segregation
in public schools as pronounced in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion .... Hence no proof of the relationship between faculty
allocation and pupil assignment was required here.7
Noting that the district court's findings of fact clearly established
that race was a factor in teacher assignment and employment, the
court vacated the trial court's judgment in that respect and ordered
that all future teacher assignment and employment be conducted
without regard to race."
Plaintiffs in Chambers v. Hendersonville City Bd. of Educ.,9 six-
teen Negro teachers, sought an injunction against "racially dis-
criminatory practices and policies"'" of the school board that had
allegedly resulted in their failure to be re-employed. The teachers'
dispute stemmed from a reduction in the enrollment of Negro pupils
in the school system" and from the subsequent integration of the
remaining Negro pupils into the formerly white schools. As a re-
sult, the number of teacher jobs in the system was reduced by five.
Although twenty-four Negro teachers had been employed up to that
time, only eight were retained for the year 1965-1966. The trial
court rejected plaintiffs' argument that this-the reduction from
twenty-four to eight--in itself raised an inference of discrimination,
and proceeded to examine the school superintendent's reasons for
not re-employing each one. He found that they were all valid non-
discriminatory reasons 2 and dismissed their complaint, the plain-
tiffs having failed to carry the burden of proof.
The court of appeals, in a 3-2 decision, reversed that dismissal.
In an opinion by Judge Bell, the majority found that since "the
S363 F.2d at 740.8Id. at 741.
o 364 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1966).
"lId. at 190.
1 217 Negro students from neighboring counties who had previously at-
tended the consolidated "Negro" school in Hendersonville were by court
order integrated into their home county schools. Id. at 190.
1 There was no "objective" reason for the failure to retain one of the
teachers. Although the judge indicated that her qualifications appeared to
him to be excellent, he declined to substitute his judgment for that of the
superintendent, since he felt the decision had been made in good faith.
Chambers v. Hendersonville -City Bd. of Educ., 245 F. Supp. 759, 764-65
(W.D.N.C. 1965).
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mandate of Brown v. Board of Education... forbids the considera-
tion of race in faculty selection' 3 the Board's apparent policy of
giving Negro pupils "adequate representation at the teacher level"' 4
implied a racial "quota" and was unlawful. The court held that
this policy coupled with a community history of racial discrimina-
tion formed a backdrop against which the "sudden disproportionate
decimation in the ranks of the Negro teachers"' 5 raised an inference
of discrimination. The burden thus placed on the school board of
justifying its conduct was not met. Accordingly, the court ordered
the board to set up "definite objective standards for the employment
and retention of teachers and to apply them to all teachers
alike . .. .-16
Racial discrimination in faculty selection and allocation was not
specifically condemned as unconstitutional in Brown v. Board of
Educ.'7 Subsequent lower court decisions have frequently been side-
tracked by problems of standing' and of burden of proof. 9 These
threshold problems and the broad discretion allowed trial courts have
prevented courts from meeting the constitutional question squarely.20
364 F.2d at 192.
1*Id. at 190.
' Id. at 192.
"ld. at 193.
17347 U.S. 483 (1954); 349 U.S. 294 (1955). The second case is fre-
quently referred to as the "implementing" decision. The original decision
was grounded on the conclusion that "segregation . . . deprived [plaintiff
pupils] of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment" and not on violation of the amendment's due process clause.
347 U.S. at 495.
"
8E.g., Bell v. School City, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963) where it was
held that no affirmative constitutional duty was imposed on school boards to
change innocently arrived at racial "imbalance," either in student bodies or
in faculties; Brooks v. School District, 267 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1959) where
Negro teachers were held to have the burden of proving that they were not
retained because of race. The latter case was distinguished by the court of
appeals in Hendersonville on the grounds that Hendersonville's history of
racial discrimination was not duplicated there.
"°Augustus v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 306 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1962)
where it was held error for a trial court to allow a motion to strike plain-
tiff's allegation relating to racial teacher assignments. See cases cited note
21 infra.
o For an example of the broad trial court discretion allowed in dealing
with the question see Board of Pub. Instruction v. Braxton, 326 F.2d 616,
620-21 (5th Cir. 1964) (within trial court authority to enjoin teacher assign-
ment on the basis of race) ; Calhoun v. Latimer, 321 F.2d 302, 311 (5th Cir.
1963) (no error for trial court to postpone consideration of racial teacher
assignment). The Calhoun decision, however, has been severely undermined
by Bradley v. School Bd., 382 U.S. 103 (1965). See notes 31-32 infra and
accompanying text. See generally Knowles, School Desegregation 42 N.C.L.
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Parents and pupils have had standing to raise the question of
teacher assignment and employment based on race "to the extent it
involves an asserted denial of constitutionally protected rights of
the pupils." 21 But in order to make out a cause of action they were
required to prove that racially motivated teacher assignments caused
a deprivation of the pupils' constitutional rights; that the denial
thus caused made the desegregation plans under attack inadequate
under Brown v. Board of Educ. The question of the nature of
proof required seems to have been contemplated by the courts as
one of fact, or law, or both.22 Whatever it was, it has almost uni-
formly eluded plaintiffs' grasp.2 3 Thus pupils' "standing" has been
a rather hollow right.
A long standing statutory remedy exists for deprivations of
constitutional rights by persons acting under color of law.24 A pub-
REv. 67, 83-84 (1963); Note, Desegregation of Public School Facidties, 51
IowA L. Rnv. 681 (1966); Note, Discrimination in the Hiring and Assign-
ment of Teachers in Public School Systems, 64 MicH. L. REv. 692 (1966).
2 Bradley v. School Bd., 345 F.2d 310, 320 (4th Cir. 1965). See also
Northcross v. Board of Educ., 333 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1964); Mapp v.
Board of Educ., 319 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1963); Augustus v. Board of Pub.
Instruction, 306 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1962); Christmas v. Board of Educ.,
231 F. Supp. 331 (D. Md. 1964).
" E.g., "[I]n a particular case it may be regarded as a question of law
or of fact.... ." Bradley v. School Bd., 345 F.2d 310, 320 (4th Cir. 1965).
See Augustus v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 306 F.2d 862, 868 (5th Cir.
1962) where court discusses the propriety of allowing defendant's motion to
strike plaintiffs' allegation that racial teacher assignment constituted a de-
privation to pupils which was prohibited by Brown v. Board of Educ. The
court dealt with both "questions of fact" and "questions of law" implying
unwillingness to categorize the issue precisely.
Whether racially discriminatory teacher assignments exist would seem
to be a question of fact; whether admittedly discriminatory practices are
forbidden by Brown v. Board of Educ., a question of law. But whether
racially motivated teacher assignments impose a denial of the "equal protec-
tion" contemplated by Brown v. Board of Educ. is apparently a mixed bag.
28 See the trial court's opinion in one of the principal cases, Wheeler v.
Bd. of Educ., 249 F. Supp. 145 (M.D.N.C. 1966). Plaintiff pupils intro-
duced the testimony of several educators and sociologists directed toward
proving that faculty segregation had an inhibitory effect on pupils. In deny-
ing the relief requested the court noted:
Actually, the testimony of . . . [a sociologist] the most impressive
witness offered by the plaintiffs, tends to disprove the plaintiffs'
charge. While recognizing the desirability of assigning teachers
without regard to race, . . . [he] felt that school children received
the greatest benefit by coming into contact with the people of other
races and cultures. This benefit would be denied Negro children at-
tending a predominantly white school if they were not also taught by
white teachers.
Id. at 154.
" REv. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). Plaintiff teachers
1966]
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lic school teacher's standing to assert his own rights, therefore, has
not been a problem.
The court of appeals, in both the principal cases, reaches the
conclusion that "the mandate of Brown v. Board of Education...
forbids the consideration of race in faculty selection just as it for-
bids it in pupil placement. '25 The Hendersonville opinion, published
one month before the Durham opinion, contains no citation to sup-
porting authority.2" The Durham case on the other hand, reaches
the conclusion after drawing what Judge Bryan seems to indicate
is none too strong support from Bradley v. School Bd.
Plaintiffs' contention in Bradley was that discrimination in facul-
ty assignment made the proposed pupil assignment plans unconstitu-
tional as to the pupils. The Supreme Court held that the district
court erred in approving the plans without also holding a "full evi-
dentiary hearing"2 on that issue and remanded the case. The court
of appeals construed the case as authority that factually discrimi-
natory teacher assignment is, as a matter of law, unconstitutional
under Brown v. Board of Educ. If that was the implication intended
by the Supreme Court in Bradley, it is difficult to see why the Court
remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. For the hearing con-
templated was to determine the "impact on . . . [the desegration
plans] of faculty allocation on an alleged racial basis,"2 not to
determine whether the alleged racial faculty allocation in fact ex-
isted. A remand on the issue would seem to indicate that the out-
come of the hearing itself would determine whether the relationship
was such that it gave rise to a cause of action on behalf of the
plaintiff pupils.
Nevertheless, the court of appeals unanimously concluded that
factual discrimination in teacher assignment, as a matter of law,
violates the command of Brown v. Board of Educ. and that no
relationship between racial teacher assignment and pupils' rights
must be shown. Since plaintiffs had proved at the trial that teacher
in the Hendersonville case based jurisdiction in their suit on this provision.
364 F.2d at 190 n.1.
364 F.2d at 192; 363 F.2d at 740.
364 F.2d at 192.27382 U.S. 103 (1965).
6 Id. at 103.
". Id. at 103. In specific response to the court of appeals' implication
in the opinion below that any relation between faculty assignment and
pupils' rights was speculative the Court said simply: "There is no merit to
the suggestion. . . ." Id. at 105.
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assignments had been made on the basis of race, the court granted
the relief sought."0
Removal of the troublesome proof requirement, even if some-
what lacking in precedential support, provides long needed relief to
Negro plaintiffs."1 Additionally, there can be little question that
faculty segregation violates the spirit and the rationale of Brown v.
Bd. of Educ.3" These factors, combined with the clear congressional
policy forbidding race considerations in employment decisions,'m
compel the conclusion that technical objections to the rule announced
have been validly overridden.
In the Hendersonville case, Judge Bell, speaking for the major-
ity, summarily concluded that Brown v. Board of Educ. commanded
an end to teacher assignments based on race. But, unlike the Dur-
ham case, plaintiffs had not satisfactorily proved that racially dis-
criminatory practices had been used. The majority drew an analogy
to cases involving racial discrimination in jury selection where a
community's history of discrimination has been held to raise an
inference of discrimination which the party in possession of the
facts must meet.34 Thus, the court held that the board's apparent
racially oriented retention policy and the sudden release of sixteen
out of twenty-four Negro teachers, when superimposed on the com-
30 363 F.2d at 740-41.1 See note 23 supra and case cited there. Teachers have been hesitant,
for a variety of reasons such as time, expense and fear of a hostile atmos-
phere, to become involved in litigation in order to assert their own rights.
See Note, Desegration of Public School Facidties, 51 IOWA L. REv. 681,
682-83 (1966). In 1963, one writer characterized pupil integration as hav-
ing moved at "glacial speed" and that teacher integration had not moved at
all, Knowles, School Desegregation, 42 N.C.L. REV. 67, 83-84 (1963). No
authoritative figures on teacher integration are available. However, for
general estimates, both for the South as a whole and for each state indi-
vidually, see SOUTHERN EDUCATION REPORTING SERVICE, STATISTICAL SUM-
MARY OF SCHOOL SEGREGATION-DESEGREGATION IN THE SOUTHERN AND
BORDER STATES (1965).
" See the opinion of the trial court in the Durham case where, although
dismissing the suit for lack of jurisdiction, it construes Colorado Anti-Dis-
crimination Comm'n v.Continental Air Lines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714 (1963) as
condemning "any policy that requires, or even permits, any racial considera-
tion whatever in the employment and placement of teacher personnel ....
249 F. Supp. at 154.
" The Equal Employment Opportunity provisions of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 clearly make racial discrimination by "employers"--both in
hiring and in assignment-unlawful. 78 Stat. 255 (1964), 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a) (1964). However, states and their political subdivisions are
specifically excluded from the coverage of the Act. Id. at § 2000e(b).
Hence, the school board employers in the principal cases were exempt.
"' 364 F.2d at 192-93 and cases cited there.
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munity's history of racial discrimination raised an inference of dis-
crimination. It placed a burden on the board which was not met.
This conclusion seems to have been premised on the existence of
several facts: (1) that the school board viewed the reduction in
Negro students as authority for a pro-rata reduction in Negro
faculty members;3r5 (2) that the Negro teachers were treated as
"applicants" for the new jobs created by the merger, rather than
being retained if they met "minimum standards" as were white
teachers;"8 (3) that the subjective test used by the school board
resulted in racially motivated retention decisions.3 7
Conceding that (1) and (2) existed, the essential element of a
cause of action must be (3), racial judgment in these plaintiffs'
cases. And this, even after painstaking scrutiny, the district judge
could not find. At the trial the court dismissed the complaint be-
cause plaintiffs had not met the burden of proof. Yet in arriving
at that decision the judge examined, individually, the cases of each
of the teachers who were not retained 8 in light of the qualifications
of the teachers with whom they competed. In all but one case there
was objective evidence supporting the board's decision.39
Judge Bryan, in a dissenting opinion, argues that this thorough
examination demonstrated the district judge's complete awareness
of the constitutional principles announced by the majority. But he
felt that the application of these general principles to all plaintiffs
resulted in an unwarranted conclusion that "they were all denied
their Constitutional rights."4 He said further:
Whatever Constitutional guidelines are recognized, the bald facts
here plainly reveal that at least 15 of the 16 unretained teachers
were not kept because of [objective reasons].... This is hardly
a record of a racial judgment. General principles do not sup-
The court felt the superintendent's testimony that Negro pupils should
have "adequate representation at the teacher level," indicated such a view.
Id. at 190.
" In short the Negro principal's report clearly reflected the knowledge
that the number of Negro teachers was to be drastically reduced;
consequently his teachers were graded comparatively while those of
the white principals were used only to eliminate those teachers who,
in the opinion of the principal or the superintendent, fell below a
minimum standard.
Id. at 191.
7 Id. at 192 n.2.
" Chambers v. Hendersonville City Bd. of Educ., 245 F. Supp. 759, 763-
64 (W.D.N.C. 1965).
" Id. at 764. See note 12 supra.
,0 364 F.2d at 193.
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plant realities; the Constitutional fundamentals stressed by the
majority here are abstract and academic.41
Still, in one instance there was a fairly clear discriminatory de-
cision on the guise of the board's discretion. When this is con-
sidered with the aggregate of the indicia of discrimination cited by
Judge Bell and with the trial judge's repeated reliance on plaintiffs'
failure to sustain their burden of proof, the result is warranted.
Racially motivated decisions are often subtly disguised and present
difficult problems of proof, especially where, as here, the discretion
of an administrative body is involved. The majority's analogy to
cases involving racial discrimination in jury selection is apt. In
Eubanks v. Louisiana,43 cited by Judge Bell, a Negro defendant
alleged that judges administered a jury selection system in a dis-
criminatory manner by exercise of their "discretion." The Supreme
Court concluded, in the face of mere general denials, that race had
been a factor in violation of the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment. Whether this is termed raising an "inference"
or not the result is the same, to replace the trial court's conclusion
that there was no discrimination with the appellate court's conclu-
sion that there was. A showing that discrimination was likely in
the particular circumstances becomes sufficient.
Taken together, the principal cases have significantly eased what
previously were two formidable obstacles to Negro plaintiffs who
seek teacher integration. First, pupils no longer need "prove" that
racial teacher assignment is a constitutional deprivation to them,
but only that teachers are in fact assigned on the basis of race.
Second, Negro teachers released en masse, who must prove that they
were denied retention because of race, will have the assistance of an
inference of discrimination thrusting the burden of justification on
41Id. at 194.
"They were: (1) superintendent's decision as to which Negro teachers
would be retained was made before he knew how many vacancies would
exist; (2) the apparent "pro-rata" policy to retain Negro teachers in pro-
portion to the racial makeup of the student body; (3) superintendent's
testimony that while he was guided by the principals' recommendations, he
made the decisions on the basis of "personal preference"; (4) Negro prin-
cipal's report was detailed and submitted in writing while white principals
made oral reports (reflecting Negro principal's knowledge that the number
of Negro teachers was to be reduced); (5) white teachers were graded com-
petitively only if below minimum standards, whereas all Negro teachers were
so graded; (6) no white teachers' qualifications were compared with those
of new applicants, whereas Negro teachers frequently were. Id. at 190-92.
, 356 U.S. 584 (1958).
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school boards. Simultaneously, the decisions have increased the
pressure on school boards to eliminate racially motivated faculty
assignment, and to base employment decisions on objective nondis-
criminatory standards. Most important though, the court of appeals
has again moved closer to making the mandate of Brown v. Board of
Educ.-now more than twelve years in existence-a reality.
PHILIP L. KELLOGG
Constitutional Law-Compulsory Blood Tests-Self-Incrimination
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States
involving the rights of the accused in state criminal proceedings
have attracted the attention of state law enforcement officials who,
undoubtedly, are concerned with the present Court's concept of the
scope of the fourth, fifth and sixth amendments. Schmerber v.
California,1 unlike most recent decisions, restricts the scope of the
fifth amendment and affords state police with a clear guideline.
Petitioner was convicted in Los Angeles municipal court of the
criminal offense of driving an automobile while under the influence
of alcohol. He was arrested at a hospital where he was receiving
treatment for injuries received in an* accident involving the auto-
mobile that he had been driving. At the direction of a police officer,
a blood sample was taken from petitioner at the hospital and an
analysis of this sample indicated by weight of alcohol in his blood
that the petitioner was intoxicated at the time of the accident.'
Petitioner objected to use of this test as evidence on the grounds
that the blood was withdrawn dispite his refusal on advice of coun-
sel to consent to it.
He contended that the admission of the test as evidence denied
him due process of law under the fourteenth amendment of the Con-
stitution as well as his specific rights under the fourth, fifth and
sixth amendments as incorporated in the fourteenth amendment.
The California court rejected these contentions and affirmed the
conviction. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Bren-
nan, held that the blood test, even though compulsary, did not vio-
1384 U.S. 757 (1966).
Concerning the reliability of blood tests as evidence of intoxication see
Ladd & Gibson, The Medico-Legal Aspects of the Blood Test to Determine
Intoxication, 24 IowA L. REv. 191 (1939) [hereinafter cited as Ladd &
Gibson].
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